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The  macro -context  
Prior to the 17
th National Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party in October 2007, a heated debate
was underway among officials and scholars on the
general orientation of “reform and opening up,” which
would reach its 30th anniversary in late 2008. Some argued
that the reforms deviated too far from the bottom line toler-
able to a communist state; the expanding private sector and
shrinking public sector were eroding the socialist state, and
more political and economic control needed to be re-im-
posed by the party-state. The opposing view asserted that
only major political reform could alleviate the current tension
in society manifested in the gap between rich and poor, be-
tween the eastern coastal areas and the hinterland, and be-
tween demands for greater development resources and ef-
forts to preserve the deteriorating environment. According to
this view, the situation was such that market-oriented reform
could not move further without political openness that al-
lowed expression of different interests and recognition of pri-
vate ownership. The debate became particularly intense
when the draft Law on Property Rights, which included
clauses on protecting private property, was examined by the
National People’s Congress. The central leadership put an
end to this debate a year or so before the Party Congress.
In a rare political move in recent Chinese politics, an article
in People’s Daily by Premier Wen Jiabao in February 2007
expressed an official line that repeated the Party’s stance of
20 years earlier: its work and its focus would remain on eco-
nomic development, based on the two pillars of keeping a
tight lid on political reform while furthering economic reform
and opening. (1)
The 17th National Party Congress ushered in General Sec-
retary Hu Jintao’s second and last five-year term. Expecta-
tions were high at home and abroad that he might deliver
strong policies now that he has better control of the political
centre. Addressing a conference marking the 30th anniver-
sary of the launch of reform and opening on 18 December
2008, Mr. Hu declared “never to take the old closed-off
road or to go astray by altering the banner,” basically reiter-
ating what Mr. Wen had expressed earlier. What clue can
we gain from these messages in judging the fate of political
reform? (2)
An all-round view of Chinese politics requires shifting the
lens from the leadership to society. Despite the official state-
ments made by top leaders, disputes have persisted since the
Assessment of the implications of experiments with village committee elections since 1987 has changed. In 2006,
direct town elections were categorically forbidden, but in 2008 public nomination and public selection were resumed
in Guiyang City for district and deputy municipal leaders. The paper explores the rationale behind the decisions and
concludes that a strategic choice is pending within the central leadership.
1. Wen Jiabao, “Guanyu shehuizhuyi chuji jieduan de lishi renwu he woguo duiwai
zhengce de jige wenti” (On some issues on the historical tasks in the primary stage of
socialism and China’s foreign policy), Xinhuanet, 26 February 2007, http://news.xin-
huanet.com/politics/2007-02/26/content_5775212.htm, accessed on 14 March 2009.
2. Hu Jintao, “Zai jinian dang de shiyijie sanzhong quanhui zhaokai 30 zhounian dahui
shang de Jianghua” (Speech at the meeting to commemorate the 30th anniversary of
the convening of the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Central Committee), Xinhuanet, 18
December 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-12/18/ con-
tent_10524481.htm.
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recent Party National Congress among officials and scholars
around the “universal values of freedom, equality, human
rights, and democracy.” Those who claim that these univer-
sal values bear the US trademark have expressed the view
that the existing Chinese political system demonstrated its
advantages during the current international financial crisis
and that there is no need to reform it. (3) Wang Changjiang
describes such opinions as “the syndrome of insensitivity to-
ward political reform.” (4) Zhou Qiren concurs with Yang 
Xiaokai that the advantages enjoyed by late-developing
countries may make politicians ignore the need for political
reform, and that when problems reach a crisis level, histori-
cal opportunity is lost. (5)
According to Wu Jinglian, since early 1980s, China’s eco-
nomic reform has been incremental in nature, i.e., the eco-
nomic portion under the traditional planning mechanism has
been retained while the market mechanism has been applied
to developing the private sector and Chinese-foreign joint
ventures. The latter has been given much of the credit for
China’s rapid growth, but has also been blamed for a num-
ber of negative effects, which can be summed up as the col-
lusion between power and business, or rent-setting and rent-
seeking by officials. (6) Is the incremental approach workable
for political reform? 
China began allowing direct elections at the village level in
the late 1980s. Two main views are taken of the conse-
quences of grassroots political reform centred on direct elec-
tions. Some scholars believe it will help maintain one-party
rule, while others hold that it will bring about radical change
or comprehensive political reform. Has the Chinese leader-
ship’s assessment of village committee elections changed? If
so, what are the reasons?
In policy implementation, Chinese leaders have taken either
a bottom-up or top-down approach, or a combination of the
two. When village direct elections were introduced in the
1980s, veteran Party leader Peng Zhen envisaged a bottom-
up development of direct elections to the county or even
provincial level. (7) Is this feasible, based on the last two
decades of experimentation? What kind of decision is pend-
ing in the leadership?
This paper will try to answer these questions by reviewing
developments over the past two decades.A revi ew o f deve lopments  to  date
Since the introduction of village committee elections nation-
wide in 1987, China has seen a variety of local initiatives ex-
perimenting with residents’ political participation and the se-
lection of local officials. In the former case, deliberative
democracy has been applied to the budget formulation and
approval process of some town governments. (8) Wenling
City, Zhejiang Province, took the lead in this area in 2001,
bringing local residents and officials together to discuss local
affairs, especially government budget formulation and imple-
mentation and major public works and services. (9) Many
county and city governments have made use of annual pub-
lic assessments of the performance of government depart-
ments or officials. In Nanjing, the capital of Jiangsu
Province, municipal government departments are assessed
by the public every year, with the leaders of the two lowest-
rated bureaus removed from office. (10)
In the latter case, elections have been expanded to the urban
equivalent of village committees, the neighbourhood com-
mittees. (11)In 1998, the Sifang District of Qingdao Munici-
pality in Shandong Province organised direct elections for its
neighbourhood committees. (12) In the following year, 26
cities throughout the country followed suit in response to a
3. Feng Yuzhang, “Zenyang renshi suowei pushi Jiazhi” (How to understand so-call “uni-
versal values”), Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 10 September 2008, http://www.chi-
nanews.com.cn/gn/news/2008/ 09-10/1377452.shtml.
4. Zhongyang dangxiao jiaoshou: zhenggai mamuzheng wudang wuguo, xu gaodu jingti
(Professor of the Central Party School: Vigilance is needed against the syndrome of
insensitivity toward political reform as it misleads the Party and state), Nanfengchuang
(Southern exposure), 19 January 2009.
5. Zhou Qiren, “Yibu wei wancheng de changquan gaige shi” (A history of unfinished own-
ership reform), Jingji Guanchabao (Economic observer news), 19 January 2009.
6. Zhang Jianjing, “Shichanghua gaige: Cong nali lai, dao nali qu” (Market-oriented reform:
Where it comes from and where it goes), Zhongguo Jingji Shibao (China Economic
Times), 3 September 2008.
7. Peng Zhen, “Qunzhong zizhi shi fazhan shehuizhuyi minzhu de zhongyao yi huan” (Mass
autonomy is an important link in the development of socialist democracy), Speech at the
Chairmanship Meeting of the Sixth NPCSC, 23 November 1987, in Peng Zhen tongzhi
guanyu cunmin weiyuanhui, jumin weiyuanhui de zhongyao jianghua (Important
speeches of Comrade Peng Zhen on village committees and residents’ committees),
unpublished compilation, Beijing, Minzhengbu jiceng zhengquan jianshesi, 1990, p. 25.
8. He Baogang and Wang Chunguang, “Deliberative Democracy in Rural China: A Case
Study,” Sociological Studies, DOI:CNKI:ISSN:1002-5936.0.2007-03-004; He Baogang,
The Search for Deliberative Democracy in China, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
9. Jia Xijin, “Zhongguo canyushi minzhu de xin fazhan—Zhejiang Wenling minzhu kentan-
hui chuanxin moshi fenxi” (The new development in the participatory democracy in
china—an analysis of the innovative model of consultative meetings in Wenling,
Zhejiang), http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID=111914, accessed on
26 January 2009.
10. “Li Yuanchao tan mowei taotai, dang ganbu jiu gai you yali”(Li Yuanchao talks about the
method of laying off the person graded last in the performance evaluation and putting
Party executives under pressure),China News Service, 30 March 2002,
http://news.china.com/zh_cn/domestic/945/20020330/10234423.html.
11. I coordinated projects for training electoral staff and monitors of neighbourhood com-
mittee elections in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Fujian Province
between 1998 and 2004. 
12. Ministry of Civil Affairs, “Chuanjian quanguo wenming chengshi dui shequ jianshe de
qishi” (Enlightened promotion of cities with an advanced culture of community building),
9 November 2007.
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directive by the Ministry of Civil Affairs. But in some cities,
such as Shanghai and Nanjing, residents failed to participate
enthusiastically. The ice was broken after two towns in Nan-
ning Municipality, Guangxi Autonomous Region, success-
fully organised direct elections in all of the eight neighbour-
hood committees under their jurisdiction in July 2001. (13) By
2002, such elections expanded from large cities to medium-
sized and small cities, and from sporadic experiment to col-
lective action in urban districts or cities.
Direct elections in village autonomous organisations have
spilled over to the election of village Party branches with the
invention of a two-ballot system in Hequ County, Shanxi
Province. The new method involves ordinary villagers first
casting votes in opinion polls regarding the candidates. Then
Party members elect the Party branch on the basis of the list
resulting from the popular vote. (14)
Furthermore, direct elections have been upgraded from non-
governmental village autonomous organisations to the lowest
level of township government. Sichuan Province took the
lead in such experiments. At the end of 1998, Nancheng
Township in Qingshen County and Buyun Township in the
Central District of Suining City organised direct elections of
government leaders at almost the same time. (15)
Various forms of indirect elections have been used to select
Party and government leaders up to the prefectural level. In
1999, Dapeng Town in Shenzhen Municipality organised
three consecutive rounds of polls involving three groups of
local elites to select the head of government. This more re-
strictive solicitation of popular opinion was soon expanded
by Zuoli Town in Shanxi Province, where all eligible voters
cast a vote of confidence followed by a vote of the deputies
of the Town People’s Congress. (16) The so-called “two ballot
system” is the extent of open elections at the lowest level of
government; (17) an earlier Buyun Township election that took
the popular vote as final was ruled “unconstitutional” by the
central government. (18) The “public nomination and public
selection” method was used to select both the Party secre-
tary and government leader in Yangji Town, Hubei
Province, in 2002. (19) The various forms of experiments are
summed up in List 1.
Experiments with competitive elections have also been car-
ried out in the selection of deputies to People’s Congresses
at the township and county levels. Its significance lies in the
fact that although the law required deputies at these two lev-
els to be directly elected as early as 1982, in most cases the
elections have been organised perfunctorily, with a low level
of competition or none at all. (20) Experiments in this vein
have been conducted in the last three years or so against a
Lis t  1 .  A Summary o f  Diff erent  Methods  fo rSelec t ing Township Leaders
• Direct election by all voters (Buyun Township, Suining City,
Sichuan Province).
• “Three-ballot system” (Dapeng Town, Shenzhen Municipality,
Guangdong Province): voters nominate candidates; elites select
final candidates for the People’s Congress (PC); PC deputies elect
the leader.
• “Two-ballot system” (Zuoli Town, Linyi County, Shanxi Province),
also used for the selection of the Party secretary & PC Chairman:
Voters cast vote of confidence; the Party committee nominates can-
didates; the Party congress or People’s Congress elects leaders.
• “Public nomination, public selection” (Nanbu County & Suining
City, Sichuan Province): Top six in written exams attend oral
exams administered by 100-odd elites. The subsequent procedure
is same as the last step of option 3.
• The PC deputies (rather than the county Party committee) direct-
ly nominate candidates (Mianyang City, Sichuan Province).
• “Two nominations plus election” (Yangji Town, Jingshan County,
Hubei Province) Similar to the method used by Dapeng Town, but
the second nomination is made by the Villagers’ Representative
Assembly.
14. Dong Jiangai, “Liangpiaozhi, liangtui yixuan and yijiantiao de chuanxinxing” (On the
innovations of the two-ballot system, two rounds of nominations and election and con-
currencies), Socialism Studies, No. 6, 2007.
15. Xin Ran, “Xiangzhen zhixuan, zhenzai shiyan de nongcun minzhu xingsh” (Direct town-
ship election: A form of rural democracy under experiment), Dangdai Shaanxi
(Contemporary Shaanxi), vol. 6, 2005. Yang Min, “Sichuan jiceng minzhu tansuo 10 nian:
98 nian diyici zhixuan xiangzhang” (Ten years of grassroots democratic exploration in
Sichuan province: The first direct election of the township government head in 1998),
Juece (Policy Making), 25 March 2008.
16. Du Ganjian, “Xiangzhenzhang xuanju zhidu gaige yanjiu” (Research on the reform of
direct elections of township government leaders), Centre for People’s Congress and
Foreign Legislature Study, 20 January 2002, http://www.e-CCPs.org/newsinfo.asp?
Newsid=7409.
17. In Zuolin Town, the “two ballot system” was used for the election of the township Party
committee and government leaders. The first ballot was cast by ordinary voters and the
second by the Township People’s Congress deputies for the election of the government
leader, or by Party members for the election of the Party Secretary. In Hequ County, the
“two ballot system” was applied to the election of the village Party branch secretary,
with villagers taking part in the primary elections and Party members endorsing the
results of the primary. 
18. Zha Qingjiu, “Minzhu bu yunxu chaoyue falu” (Democracy is not permitted to exceed the
limits of the law), Fazhi ribao (Legal affairs daily), 19 January 1999.
19. Long Gong, Zhang Shihong and Zhou Zhibin, “Hubeisheng shouwei ‘haitui zhixuan’
xiangzhen dangwei shuji changsheng” (Hubei Province has its first township Party sec-
retary by the method of “sea nomination and direct election”), 7 January 2003,
www.people.com.cn.
20. E E, “Wo suo canjia de renda daibiao zhixuan” (The direct election of deputies to the
people’s congress in which I participated), China Elections & Governance,
http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?NewsID =101592, 18 January 2007.
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background of discouragement through formal directives or
circulars from mid-level authorities, but support from individ-
ual officials at higher levels.
In summation, local democratic experiments represented by
village self-government reached high tide at the turn of the
century, as demonstrated by the developments described
above. Here it is necessary to respond to possible challenges
to my applying the term “democracy” in the context of the
local experiments discussed in this paper. My response is two-
fold: first, what has been carried out in China to date is of
course not Western-style democratisation, even though it is
worth emphasizing a point made by G. Schubert on this issue: 
(…) much depends on the people’s perception of
what is democratic and what is not. In that sense,
there might be some justification for the Communist
Party to speak of such a thing, if only it has the sup-
port of the people (…). (21)
Secondly, I find it necessary to differentiate between what
has been permitted to date (or the current state of the exper-
iment) and what the reformers desire. The veteran leader
Peng Zhen envisaged that implementation of direct elec-
tions in the villages would have a bottom-up chain effect on
higher levels of government. A review of Zhao Ziyang’s
views expressed in office and in retirement may also provide
a convincing footnote. Few would have commented that his
political reform programme as announced in 1987 meant in-
stalling a multi-party system at all levels of government. We
should not equate what has been done with what is desired.
Likewise, the nature of the experiment should not be judged
by its success or failure. Both the Chinese and Western gov-
ernments have acknowledged that the 1989 student move-
ment was pro-democracy in the Western sense, although it
was suppressed. Referring to the previous statement that
local democratic experiments reached a high tide, the follow-
ing two points are particularly noteworthy:
First, the Organic Law of the Village Committees was re-
vised and enacted by the National People’s Congress in
1998 as a formal law after 11 years as a “law for trial imple-
mentation.” The new law incorporates the experience of the
nationwide experiments in the previous decade by endorsing
the so-call “sea election” (election without candidates de-
cided by primary elections) used for the first time in Lishu
County, Jilin Province, as well as enlarging the scope of elec-
tion and guaranteeing, to a greater extent, the voters’ free ex-
pression of will with the availability of a private booth for
writing ballots. (22)
Second, all provinces, municipalities directly administered
by the Central Government, and autonomous regions have
organized direct village elections since the adoption of the
new law. Prior to 2001, Guangdong and Yunnan provinces
had dispatch offices of the township government located in
the villages. These offices were staffed by appointees of the
township government, and therefore no direct elections were
required. The nature of the law for trial implementation
meant that provinces could decide not to organise village
committee elections. 
All these experiments share a common characteristic: they
are government promoted or guided. Under the government
organisation, local residents or cadres go to the polls and in
the process receive training in democracy. This kind of mo-
bilised democracy is meaningful as a first step of democrati-
sation, but also brings limitations leading to later difficulties
or stagnation. Since 1998, tensions have become apparent
between village committees and village Party branches, and
between village and township governments, with the imple-
mentation of the new law. These tensions impede the fur-
ther development of village self-government. Proposed solu-
tions to smooth out the two sets of relationships are confined
to guaranteeing the Party’s leadership and control of the gov-
ernment. More specifically, the response to the first tension
was the “two ballot system” adopted by Linyi County,
Shanxi Province, in which one official serves concurrently as
chairman of the village committee and secretary of the vil-
lage Party branch. They still operate under the dual confines
or within the limits of mobilised democracy, and their effect
has been modest as a result. The response to the second
type of tension has been increasing the transparency of the
township government administration. In reality, however,
most township governments find all kinds of ways to limit
openness. The nature of village self-government, i.e., domi-
nation by the government, means that the relationship be-
tween the village and township governments takes prece-
dence, and the institutional deficiencies of mobilised democ-
racy does not offer any effective way out of this. The fre-
quency and wide range of disputes over village elections and
the interference of township governments in village self-gov-
ernment highlight these deficiencies. 
It was against this background that the 16th National Party
Congress in 2002 adopted the approach of “using intra-party
21. Gunter Schubert, “Democracy Under One-Party Rule? A Fresh Look at Direct Village and
Township Elections in the PRC,” China Perspectives, no. 46, March-April 2003.
22. Xinhua Daily Telegraph, “Lishu: Haixuan danshengdi’ minzhulu geng kuan” (Lishu: The
place where the “sea elections” were born enjoys brighter prospect for democracy), 14
September 2009.
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democracy to promote the people’s democracy.” (23) Innova-
tions in intra-party democracy include competitive elections
of deputies to town and county Party Congresses; annual
sessions of Party Congresses instead of once every five
years; and making decisions on important matters, especially
the official appointments, through the full Party committee
instead of only through its standing committee. The value
and implications of these measures in China’s democratic
development will be discussed later.
In 2006, direct town elections were categorically forbidden. In
2008, public nominations and public selection were resumed
in Guiyang City for district and deputy municipal leaders. (24)
The difference between direct elections and public nomina-
tion and selection lies in the former being open to all eligible
voters, and the latter extended only to local elites. 
Of all these types of experiments, direct village and township
elections are the most significant new steps in democratisation
because they present real choices to voters, and candidates
compete with their own platforms or promises to voters. This
will also be be discussed at greater length later in this paper. The  changing  assessment ofimpl ications and exper iments
Around 1980, when the first few village committees were
voluntarily set up by farmers in the Guangxi Zhuang Au-
tonomous Region, they soon won the recognition of the
party-state, as they filled a management vacuum that had de-
veloped in the rural areas following the collapse of the com-
mune system. The central leadership reached a consensus
on the institutionalisation of village self-government, and in-
dicated its approval of the role of village committees in reor-
ganising farmers by quickly enshrining their official status in
the Constitution in 1982. The consensus was built on a bal-
ance of pragmatism and ideology. Village self-government
was found to be as effective in organising rural society as a
government dispatch office, but with lower administrative
and fiscal costs. Ideologically, village self-government was a
continuation of the CCP’s mass line in that, on the one
hand, it is an invention of farmers that should be respected
by the Party, and on the other hand, the institutionalisation
and function of the new grassroots organisation embody the
mass line, or village self-government is institutionalised mass
line: it serves to increase the farmers’ identification with the
party-state by partially empowering them. This consensus ex-
plains how village self-government could overcome obstacles
at the early stage and become an officially endorsed form of
organisation at the grassroots level in the rural areas. (25)
Ever since village self-government was instituted, two differ-
ent assessments of the movement have persisted. Its propo-
nents wanted to use it to empower rural residents and initi-
ate the promotion of democracy in China, with a view to up-
grading gradually to the county and even provincial level.
These advocates have become more confident of such a
prospect with recent developments resulting from the imple-
mentation of direct township elections. 
Opponents, on the other hand, have no faith in the proper
exercise of democratic rights by rural residents, whom they
regard as lacking in democratic concepts and skills, and they
allege that village elections are prone to domination by clans
or control by money politics. The Party apparatus is loath to
relinquish the party-state’s control over the villages, and an-
ticipates that direct elections will result in village committees
composed of non-Party members. Local government depart-
ments, especially at the township level, fear loss of control
over villages with the conversion of the relationship between
the township and the village from “leadership” to “guid-
ance.” They see inevitable conflict between the right of self-
governance and government administrative power, and fear
that deterioration of village self-governance will become a
source of unrest in the rural areas.
For these reasons, central leaders led by then-NPC Chair-
man Peng Zhen and the implementing agency, the Ministry
of Civil Affairs, were obliged to make a tactical retreat: the
force of the proposed Organic Law on Village Committees
was reduced by turning it into a law for trial implementation;
it would first be implemented in some experimental areas to
gain experience, but the priority was placed on obtaining the
support of the local Party and government for implementa-
tion rather than on achieving a certain standard of demo-
cratic election, management, decision-making, and supervi-
sion.
After a few years of experiments after 1988, the Ministry of
Civil Affairs identified direct elections as the key to the in-
stitutionalisation of village self-government. The work focus
was placed on designing relatively free and fair electoral pro-
cedures that would allow “capable persons” to serve in the
23. Hu Jintao, “Report to the Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of
China on 15 Oct. 2007,” Xinhua, 24 October 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng-
lish/2007-10/24/content_6938749.htm, accessed 7 November 2008.
24. Han Xue, “Guiyang dangzheng ganbu renmian gaige: Gongtui gongxuan, ganbu jing-
gang” (The reform of the appointment and removal of party and government cadres:
public nomination and public selection, cadres compete for positions), www.news.cn,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-12/15/content_10508639.htm, accessed 12
February 2009.
25. Li Fan, Grassroots Democracy 2004, Beijing, Intellectuals Property Publishing House,
2005.
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village committees. They were expected to help consolidate
grassroots organisations, maintain local social order, and pro-
mote local economic development. To this end, the Ministry
formed a united front with local government. Village self-
government to some extent improved relations between the
party-state and farmers and alleviated conflicts between offi-
cials and villagers. This fact brought about a temporary part-
nership between the Ministry and the Party departments.
However, with the rigorous promotion of direct elections in
village committees over the course of a few years, doubts
over their value emerged. Given that Party branches form
the “leadership core” in the villages, no matter how compet-
itive elections were and how competent and accountable the
elected cadres were, the democratic value of such experi-
ments was limited. However, the two-ballot system that
opened positions in the Party branches to the poll of ordi-
nary villagers improved the quality of village democracy to
some extent. Up to this point, it seemed that village self-gov-
ernment was still viewed positively by the central leadership.
It is notable that in 1998, former President Jiang Zemin
praised it as “the third invention” of Chinese farmers, fol-
lowing the introduction of the household contract responsi-
bility system and the development of rural enterprises. (26)
The end of 1998 saw the first breakthrough in upgrading di-
rect elections to the township level with an experiment in
Suining County, Sichuan Province. The immediate official
reaction of the central leaders was negative, but elections
less competitive than in Buyun Township were nevertheless
organised in several provinces. Later, the emphasis of exper-
iments was placed on the opinion poll of candidates for sec-
retary of the township Party committees. Following the deci-
sion of the NPC in October 2004 on extending the term of
office of the town (township) government from three years
to five, elections for deputies to the People’s Congresses at
the county and township levels were scheduled for between
July 2006 and December 2007. (27) This should have pro-
vided opportunities for further experiments, but to the disap-
pointment of some reformers, Sheng Huaren, Vice-Chair-
man of the NPC Standing Committee, reiterated in August
2006 that direct elections of township government leaders
were illegal and warned that evil foreigners were using the
tool of human rights and democracy against China. (28) As
noted previously, no more experiments were carried out until
2008.
The current setback or stagnation is in fact related to the in-
stitutional limitations of mobilised democracy. These built-in
confines can be summed up as follows: (1) the contradiction
between the varied goals of mobilised democracy; (2) the
conflict between its means and ends; (3) conflicts within the
power structure of the party-state; and (4) the conflict be-
tween policies and laws. 
The party-state aims to give local residents some political
freedom in the form of participation in the management of
local affairs while keeping ultimate control of grassroots au-
tonomous organisations. In this context, the village commit-
tees and the neighbourhood committees carry the dual char-
acteristics of administrative and autonomous organisations.
On the one hand, committee members are agents of the
local government, responsible for fulfilling the tasks of the
state. On the other hand, they are leaders of the local com-
munity, responsible for handling local affairs and conveying
residents’ demands and opinions to the government. Their
dual role originates from different and sometimes conflicting
sources, and draws different expectations from the govern-
ment and local residents. When the interests of the local gov-
ernment and residents are similar, their days are easy, but
when the two conflict, committee members will be blamed
by either the government or residents. The tradition of cen-
tralisation has allowed the state to extend its reach to the
grassroots, resulting in serious interference in local auton-
omy. In the rural areas, the township government often med-
dles in village affairs, even unlawfully removing elected vil-
lage committee members from office. Through clever manip-
ulation it can effectively control a village committee via the
village Party branch.
The reason the party-state resorted to mobilised democracy
was to adjust the mode of local management. But the use of
democratic election, management, decision-making, and su-
pervision allows the new governance model to operate ac-
cording to its own rules, which are often unacceptable to the
local government. For example, the government devoted
much effort to improving electoral rules and procedures at
the early stage of direct elections, when villagers doubted
that they would actually be allowed to hold free and fair elec-
tions. Since then, villagers have often used these improved
regulations to resist interference by the local government.
The local Party organisation departments used to appoint vil-
26. Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 25 September 1998, p.1.
27. NPC, “Quanguo xian xiang liangji renda huanjie xuanju 2006 nian 7 yue 1 ri zhi 2007
nian 12 yue 31 ri juxing” (Nationwide elections during the term change of the people’s
congresses at the two levels of county and township scheduled for 1 July 2006 and 31
December 2007) http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/28320/62275/, accessed on 14 March
2007.
28. Sheng Huaren, “Xian xiang renda huanjie mianlin xin wenti, xu jianchi sange yuanze”
(The term change of the county and township people’s congresses faces new problems
and three major principles must be adhered to), in Seeking Truth, available at the web-
site of the NPC on 30 August 2006, http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/14554/ 4758934.html,
accessed on 14 March 2007.
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lage leaders under the principle of “Party control of cadres.”
With competitive elections placing more non-Party members
in village committees, the Party organisation departments have
become concerned and have exerted pressure on the govern-
ment departments responsible for village self-government.
The central and mid-level government on the one side, and
the township government on the other, sometimes clash over
the implementation of grassroots autonomy. According to
the Organic Law of the Village Committees, the township
government can only guide rather than lead the work of the
village autonomous organisation; but in fact, the township
government cannot operate effectively without the support of
village cadres. Heavy-handedness by township officials tends
to strain township governments’ relations with village com-
mittees, and wronged village cadres often win the sympathy
of central and mid-level officials. After the formation of a po-
litical alliance among local officials, elites (including village
cadres), and economic enterprises, a new tripartite power
pattern has emerged in recent years between the central gov-
ernment, local government, and farmers. The local govern-
ment tends to use all means to protect local interests and ex-
pects the central government’s support. Normally the central
government ignores the improper behaviour of local govern-
ments, so long as they maintain local stability. As a result,
farmers’ interests are often sacrificed.
The CCP depends on policy as a tool for exercising its lead-
ership. This was not a problem at the early stage of mo-
bilised democracy, but its stable development cannot pro-
ceed without laws. The development of democracy will in-
evitably contradict the interests of local Party departments;
hence there must be laws, and the laws must be obeyed. If
the rule of law is to be respected, policies must sometimes
give way. Several debates have occurred in the process of
mobilised democracy. On the basis of the Organic Law of
the Village Committees, some people argue that the com-
mittee is the highest authority in the village, as it is elected
by all eligible voters, and the Party branch should follow its
leadership instead of standing above it, because the Party
branch is not endorsed by the villagers. This interpretation
naturally has many opponents. The verdict of the CCP Cen-
tral Committee is that the Party must lead the village com-
mittees. In the current policy environment, the relevant ex-
isting laws sometimes encounter enforcement difficulties,
and not all prospective laws required for democratic develop-
ment are likely to be enacted. As sound laws pose difficul-
ties to any attempts to control elections, it is understandable
that in the important field of democratic development, a vac-
uum remains in the realm of law.
An exploration of  the  rationalebehind the  decis ion to mobi l i zedemocracy
Direct village and township elections have many layers of po-
litical implications. While they have had a direct impact on
the lowest levels of government, they have also had long-
term and strategic influence on China’s meso- and macro-
politics. Nobody can predict the political outcome of direct
elections, either in theoretical or practical terms. This results
in differing opinions among central leaders and vacillation
over the development of grassroots democracy.
More specifically, direct village elections have a number of po-
litical implications for local governance: (1) their impact on the
status of village Party branches (strengthening or weakening);
(2) the possibility that village elections will produce cadres
more inclined to listen to the opinions of villagers and safeguard
their interests; (3) the possibility that village elections could
weaken the township government’s political control over village
institutions; (4) the possibility that village elections could make
state policies difficult to implement in the countryside. 
From the macro-political perspective, the fundamental question
is whether village elections are conducive to enhancing the le-
gitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. A related concern
is whether implementation of direct elections in the villages will
start a bottom-up chain effect that will reach the higher levels
of government, as Party veteran Peng Zhen envisaged.
From the outset, grassroots democracy has been considered
compatible with strong control by the party-state, and elections
were designed to increase mass support for the Party. With
this understanding, allowance was made for the gradual up-
grading of elections as a route to China’s democratisation.
However, the 2000 Taiwan elections saw the end of the long-
term rule of the Kuomintang, while a series of “colour revolu-
tions” in Eastern Europe and Central Asia resulted in pro-
Western governments coming to power. It was against this
background that Chinese leaders increased their vigilance
against the so-called peaceful evolution strategy of the West.
In a notable related move, the government also tightened con-
trol over NGOs. Then came the NPC decision forbidding
further experiments with direct township elections, under the
assumption that direct elections could threaten the Party’s rule
rather than consolidate it as previously believed. If this analy-
sis holds water, the decision is still in line with the Party’s
overriding concern with strengthening its governing capability.
It is worth here reviewing the background and original goal
of the party-state’s decision to mobilise democracy. In 1978,
when reform and opening was launched, the Chinese lead-
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ership abandoned collectivism in the economic sphere for a
policy that permitted both economic growth and inequality.
Meanwhile, in the political sphere, the strategy of adminis-
tration absorbing politics was meant to satisfy demands for
political participation on the part of political, economic, and
intellectual elites for the sake of the regime’s stability. In ad-
dition, the traditional model of mobilised political participa-
tion was still used. Some central leaders wanted to continue
political socialisation of the masses through a kind of institu-
tionalised mass line, i.e., grassroots autonomy as a platform
for local residents’ political participation. Although this pol-
icy was compromised by the economic development model
of local authorities, economic deprivation of farmers in the
modernisation process, and non-democratic culture and
ideas, interaction between central and local leaders pro-
duced a consensus on “electing capable persons,” and mo-
bilised democracy gained traction.
Since mobilised democracy was launched by the party-state,
it could be applied nationwide. However, its origins with the
central authorities gave it an innate ideological conservatism,
which explains why the development of mobilised democ-
racy ground to a halt once it transcended originally envis-
aged boundaries. Local governments, on the other hand,
have demonstrated more varied attitudes. Their initial oppo-
sition and later support both reflect consideration of their
own interests, with much less regard for ideology. They have
been willing to promote mobilised democracy if they deem
it effective in dealing with local problems. 
Both the initial design of the central authorities and local
governments’ acceptance demonstrate an adjustment of gov-
erning mode in light of economic and social change. On the
side of the party-state, mobilised democracy is a form of
grassroots autonomy and therefore an adjustment of the re-
lationship between the state and society. Both village self-
government and urban community self-government represent
an effort by the party-state to transform grassroots organisa-
tions from administrative bodies to autonomous bodies in the
context of the state’s adjustment of society’s governing
mode. The nature of both kinds of self-government is an in-
stitutional arrangement based on the state’s delegation of
power to society rather than an institutional arrangement
based on the transfer of rights from local residents to the au-
tonomous organisation. Under this arrangement, the govern-
ment concedes to society a very limited autonomous space,
namely, residents’ limited right of participation through
tightly controlled grassroots autonomous organisations. Local
autonomous organisations take implementation of party-state
policies as their primary mission while enjoying limited au-
thority in the handling of community affairs. The party-state
grants limited rights of election and participation in the man-
agement of local affairs in hopes of producing “capable per-
sons” who obey the orders of the higher authorities.
Under China’s unified party-government political system,
the central authorities have emphasised the consolidation of
local Party organisations and their leadership role in imple-
menting mobilised democracy. In fact, both village self-gov-
ernment and urban community self-government are pro-
moted as contributing to the building up of local Party organ-
isations. In elections for grassroots autonomous organisa-
tions, the party-state has always put a priority on ensuring
that Party members are elected. In short, mobilised democ-
racy has little space for development. 
While considering what the party-state holds back, it is also
necessary to note what has been proposed and imple-
mented. Intra-party democracy and the people-first policy
should be discussed against this background.
The CCP has declared intra-party democracy to be vital to
its survival, and it has been an important topic among schol-
ars since it was officially put forward at the 16th National
Party Congress in 2002. The basic concept and approach of
“expanding intra-Party democracy to develop people’s
democracy” were reiterated during the Fourth Plenum of the
17th CCP Central Committee in September 2009. (29)
The importance attached to intra-party democracy is in fact a
response or gesture toward ever-louder calls for democracy in
society. The increasing social space since reform and opening
has created pressure from outside the system, and democratic
development in society has posed demands for reform within
it. In an era in which democracy is developing in society, if
the Party maintains authoritarian rule, it may be torn by in-
ternal dissension and discord and shunned by the public. Fac-
ing societal pressure, the Party was obliged to place political
reform on its agenda. A practical challenge has been the
search for safe means for reform. Compared with delegating
some power to society or allowing societal democracy, intra-
party democracy is safer, as delegating authority to lower-
level Party organisations and allowing Party members to
enjoy greater freedom and participation do not threaten the
Party’s ultimate control. Hence, intra-party democracy be-
came a rational choice for the Party in promoting democracy.
But it is a passive choice.
In general, most scholars within the establishment hold pos-
itive views of the relationship between the intra-party democ-
29. Xinhua News Agency, “CCP to expand intra-Party democracy: Communiqué,“ 
18 September 2009.
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racy and democracy for the nation as a whole. According to
Wang Guixiu, making the development of intra-party democ-
racy the breakthrough point of political reform is the best op-
tion, as it is substantive, affects other sectors, and is low-
risk. (30) Xu Yaotong holds that under conditions in which
democracy is lacking in the Party and society, developing
intra-party democracy to promote democracy among the peo-
ple is feasible and helps avoid risks and faults. (31) Scholars
disagree on how to implement intra-party democracy, how-
ever. Some are for a top-down approach, while others be-
lieve that a bottom-up approach is preferable.
Local experiments in promoting intra-party democracy have
produced some positive effects, mainly reflected in the an-
nual sessions of local Party congresses, the direct election of
Party Secretaries, and checks and balances between Party
departments, as noted previously. In general, however, they
have not surpassed similar experiments involving township
government and village organisations. At the same time, the
limitations placed on the experiments have brought about
new problems. Distortion in the implementation process, as
reflected in the dominance of leaders over participation by
ordinary Party members or local residents and their deci-
sions, render intra-party democracy largely symbolic. The
reputation of such experiments raises little hope among the
public, as a result of which they serve neither to effectively
enhance the legitimacy of the Party’s rule nor to improve
local governance. The gist of the issue is the reluctance of
power-holders to share power. The situation raises doubts
about the strategy itself. Intra-party democracy is intended to
facilitate people’s democracy, but the fact is that this concept
was preceded by democratic experiments in the direct elec-
tion of village committees. Before intra-party democracy can
serve as a role model for societal democracy, it must catch
up with the latter in both scope and quality. There has been
no sign of this happening so far. It is therefore valid to ask
whether it is merely a tactic or excuse to hold back the mo-
mentum for direct election of township government leaders.
Difficulties in promoting both local and intra-party democ-
racy may have prompted Chinese leaders to consider an al-
ternative, and it may not be cynical to analyze the people-
first policy in this context. In his government report delivered
to the annual session of the NPC in March 2007, Premier
Wen Jiabao put forward specific programs for improving the
people’s livelihood, such as provision of health care and so-
cial security packages to all eligible citizens, and efforts to
ensure that all students admitted to colleges and universities
are able to attend through the provision of scholarships to
the eligible and the waiving of tuition fees for all students of
teachers’ universities run by the Ministry of Education. (32)
These can be regarded as concrete measures for implement-
ing the Building the New Countryside Program as formu-
lated under the concepts of scientific development and pro-
motion of a harmonious society advanced by Premier Wen
and President Hu Jintao. The measures indicate a shift in
the government’s focus from single-minded pursuit of GDP
to provision of public goods and services. 
The active promotion of these people-first policies contrasts
with discouragement of the experiment on direct elections.
Does this indicate a reconsideration of the emphasis on local
governance and a new understanding of the route for
China’s political development?
It seems that the Party now prefers people-first policies based
on maintaining rapid economic growth. As Premier Wen re-
cently stressed, while extending democracy, improving the
legal system, and continuously pushing forward political struc-
tural reform, attention is currently focused on spurring eco-
nomic development, safeguarding the rights and interests of
citizens, combating corruption, improving governmental trust-
worthiness and effectiveness, and promoting social har-
mony. (33) In order to improve the provision of public goods
and services, efforts are being made to strengthening central
power, with a notable recent trend toward reviving vertical
control. Of course, to the Party all means of prolonging its
grip on power are acceptable, whether its legitimacy is based
on active popular support via elections or passive consent re-
sulting from the Party’s ability to continue delivering benefits.A strategic  cho ice  pending  inthe  central  l eadership
The experiments to date have proven that China should and
can introduce direct elections to the lower levels of govern-
ment, beginning with the township level. The top leadership
should make a political decision to that end, rather than an
ill-advised acquiescence by central leaders individually or
collectively to further experiments with the models created
30. Wang Guixiu, “The breakthrough point of political reform: Developing intra-party democ-
racy,“ Beijing Observation, vol. 2, 2003, p. 11.
31. Xu Yaotong, “On intra-party democracy,“ www.people.com.cn, 15 November 2006.
32. Xinhua News Agency, “Shijie quanguo renda wuci huiyi Kaimuhui Wen Jiabao zuo
zhengfu gongzuo baogao wenzi shilu” (The proceedings of the opening session of the
5th Annual Meeting of the 10th NPC on Premier Wen’s Government Work Report),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/zhibo/20070305/wz.htm, accessed on 14 February 2009.
33. Wen Jiabao, “Guanyu shehuizhuyi chuji jieduan de lishi renwu he woguo duiwai zhengce
de jige wenti”(On some issues on the historical tasks in the primary stage of socialism
and China’s foreign policy), Xinhua Net, 26 February 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2007-02/26/content_5775212.htm, accessed on 12 February 2009.
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in the past two decades. One reason is, as a prominent local
reformer has concluded, that bottom-up reforms are too
costly and sub-optimal. Luo Chongmin has gained fame na-
tionwide as an official who has promoted comprehensive re-
forms in many fields: When he was Party Secretary of
Honghe Prefecture, Yunnan Province, Luo carried out
large-scale experiments involving direct township elections
(planned for the whole prefecture and actually organised in
one county), merging the rural and urban residential regis-
tration systems, and conversion of hospital and media insti-
tutions into limited liability companies. He comments that
all such reform should start at the top. (34)
The other reason is that the various forms of public nomina-
tion and selection are too procedurally complicated. Frequent
elections for various positions are burdensome in terms of ex-
penditure of human and material resources, and could lead to
premature apathy toward elections among ordinary voters.
The areas most active in promoting local democracy organ-
ise too many different elections, including for village commit-
tee, village Party branch, township government leader, town-
ship Party secretary and Party committee members, and
deputies to the county and township People’s Congresses. In
addition, electoral rules and procedures typically require pri-
maries for each category of election. The constant stream of
elections can easily produce an over-politicised environment
that becomes a burden on citizens and that is less than con-
ducive to fostering a sound electoral and political culture.
I participated in an experiment to combine some categories
of elections under a project entitled “Support Township
Competitive Elections” in Ya’an Municipality, Sichuan
Province from 2004 to 2006. (35) Four townships organised
direct elections of Party and government leaders as well as
deputies to the township People’s Congress on the same day
in April 2006. The experiment was successful in combining
the different elections and improving competitiveness, but it
could not avoid complicated procedures under the applicable
Party rules and local electoral laws and regulations.
A review of the process revealed a conspicuous drawback:
procedures for competitive elections of township Party and
government leaders are too complicated, as they have to abide
by the applicable Chinese electoral rules while trying to adopt
basic electoral procedures used elsewhere in the world.
The prevailing Chinese procedure for choosing candidates
for township Party and government leaders includes the fol-
lowing steps:
a) the county Party organisation department carries out an
opinion poll;
b) relevant departments or leaders nominate candidates;
c) a list of primary candidates is proposed by the party or-
ganisation department after the survey;
d) a decision is reached by the county Party standing com-
mittee and full committee;
e) candidates are officially nominated by the township Party
committee or PC presidium;
f) election procedures are initiated as prescribed by law.
In comparison, the procedure for public nomination of
township Party and government leaders is more compli-
cated:
a) set up a leading group for public nomination;
b) publicity and training activities;
c) registration of candidates;
d) screening of registered candidates by the county leading
group;
e) screening of registered candidates by the county Party
committee;
f) list of registered candidates published;
g) campaigning by registered candidates;
h) vote by all eligible voters;
i) announcement of election results;
j) endorsement of the election results by the county Party
committee;
k) list of official candidates published;
l) initiation of the election procedure as prescribed by law.
(This means the People’s Congress deputies vote for,
and the People’s Congress presidium appoints, the town-
ship government leaders.)
From the above, it is clear that the procedures for public nom-
inations include elements and steps of both the traditional
method of deciding candidates and the open and competitive
election procedures employed internationally. One of the
reservations expressed regarding the immediate introduction
of competitive elections at the township level is that organis-
ing elections is too costly. The adoption of direct elections
would reduce the cost by simplifying the procedures. It would
also remove the possibility of different outcomes between the
popular vote and the vote by People’s Congress deputies, and
therefore requires a political decision at the top. It would be
beneficial to both the Party and the people if decisive com-
petitive elections were put into practice before the introduc-
tion of direct elections. Decisive competitive elections mean
34. Pan Xiaoling, “Qiguan Luo Chongmin” (An extraordinary official, Luo Chongmin);
“Zixiaershang gai shi gao chengben de gaige” (Bottom-up reform is high-cost),
Southern Weekend, 15 January 2009, pp. 1-2.
35. Stig Thoergensen, Joergen Elklit, and Dong Lisheng, “Consultative elections of Chinese
township leaders – report on a recent experiment in Ya’an, Sichuan,” China Information,
vol. XXII (1), 2008, pp. 67-89.
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36. Zhou Qiren, “Yibu wei wancheng de changquan gaige shi” (A history of unfinished own-
ership reform), Economic Observer News, 19 January 2009; He Zengke, “Jianjing
zhengzhi gaige yu minzhu de zhengzhi zhuanxing” (Incremental political reform and
democratic political transformation), 25 December 2008, http://www.china
innovations.org/showNews.html?id=713.
N o  2 0 1 0 / 264
that the results of the popular vote should be binding or final,
and the township People’s Congress should normally endorse
the results of the popular vote — otherwise the electorate can
recall the PC deputies. Candidates should gain qualifications
through a public servant training system once the current mul-
tiple screenings are abolished. This will ensure the implemen-
tation of Party policy and state law at the lower levels of gov-
ernment after the introduction of direct elections.Concluding  remarks
Efforts to denigrate universal values have resulted in powerful
forces against democratisation of Chinese politics. But as the
Hu-Wen leadership recently reiterated, the move towards rule
of law and democracy is endorsed in the Party’s political plat-
form, so the general direction is likely to be maintained. In the
face of vocal opposition, however, local reformers may hesitate
to consider further experiments. A greater challenge now faces
the central leadership: a race between corruption and reform
has brought about another race between reform and revolu-
tion. (36) It would seem that the more realistic option is to design
democratic reform that will make local officials accountable to
the public without immediately undermining central control.
The incremental approach to political reform has achieved du-
bious results thus far. Experiments with increasing competition
in township elections show that maintaining the existing cadre
appointment procedures introduces too many complications
and waters down the reform aspects. Indeed, unlike in the eco-
nomic sphere, it is unthinkable to create a new polity alongside
the existing one. With only one government leadership at any
level, incremental reform can involve no more than instilling
greater competition into selection procedures rather than leav-
ing the existing polity intact while creating a new one for ex-
periment. The effectiveness of the various existing experiments
is questionable, however, given that cumbersome procedures
test voters’ endurance.
It may be too early to claim that new consideration has been
given to the bottom-up strategy of democratisation. Even if that
proves to be the case, it remains consistent with China’s basic
approach to reform as set by Deng Xiaoping, which focuses on
implementing market-oriented economic reform while keeping
a lid on political reform. At the same time, three decades of
rapid economic growth have been accompanied by growing
gaps between regions and social strata, resulting in social ten-
sions that test the Party’s governing ability. The government
has responded to this social tension with its people-first policy
and calls for building a harmonious society. While economic
growth is clearly unable to automatically resolve social prob-
lems, it remains to be seen whether the new people-first policy
can be effectively implemented. There is a growing consensus
among Chinese officials and scholars that the time has come
to introduce substantive and major political reform. The de-
creasing executive capabilities of the party-state bureaucracy
and especially local governments are manifested in widespread
corruption and internal inertia. Placing them under public su-
pervision has become more necessary than ever before.
After two decades of competitive elections carried out at the
village and township levels, major decisions need to be made
on the categories of elections and simplified procedures. Sim-
ply replicating the various previous experiments is inadvisable,
given the excessive number of categories and methods of elec-
tion and the complexity of their procedures. The achievements
made to date can only be consolidated through the momentum
of sustained development; without progress, there will be re-
gression. As it is, the suspension of direct township elections in
2006 has manifested itself in the deteriorated quality of re-
cently held village committee elections. In contrast to the recent
past, Chinese media are reporting little on current village elec-
tions. In this sense, the re-introduction of competitive elections
will not serve their purpose as a showcase unless they are
granted greater room to manoeuvre.
One option worth considering is to organise the election of
township Party and government leaders at the same time as
People’s Congress deputies. There are also many areas where
the qualifications of candidates could be harmlessly reduced to,
for example, those aged over 18, literate, and (if for the Party
positions) being a Party member. Primary elections should be
open to more voters, if not requiring the attendance of all vot-
ers. At least two kinds of “ticket systems” can be used: (1) the
Party secretary and government head form a ticket; or (2) the
government head selects deputy leaders. Candidates should be
permitted to conduct campaigns supported by volunteers. Cam-
paigning methods (such as funding and use of media) should
be specified in campaign rules or regulations. Finally, the as-
sembly of Party members and People’s Congresses must re-
spect the will of the voters and endorse the results of popular
polls.
In short, more meaningful experiments require political deci-
sions at the top. Sporadic piece-meal reform is unlikely to con-
tribute significantly to democratisation. •
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